BioelectricaAlterspan Labs
Minds of small things  ·  Article

Neutral monism, dual-aspect monism and the mind-body problem

Neutral monism and dual-aspect monism are positions on the mind-body problem. On neutral monism, the worries about interaction that troubled Cartesian dualism disappear, but the problem of mental causation may reappear. Friston, Wiese and Hobson (2020) describe dual-aspect monism as the view that reality has a mental and a physical aspect, and note its closeness to neutral monism.1 Later authors in this field argue that the mind-body divide itself limits where cognition is sought.5

Earliest held
2020, Friston KJ, Wiese W, Hobson JA
Most discussed in
Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness…, 2020
In the library
15 passages in 3 works
Rewritten
2026-10-25
18501875190019251950197520002025Friston KJ, Wiese W, Hobson JA, 20201Friston KJ, Wiese W, Hobson JA, 20202Friston KJ, Wiese W, Hobson JA, 20203Friston KJ, Wiese W, Hobson JA, 20204Ciaunica A, Shmeleva EV, Levin M, 20235Ciaunica A, Shmeleva EV, Levin M, 20236Levin M, Resnik DB, 20267Levin M, Resnik DB, 20268Levin M, Resnik DB, 20269
01

Two aspects, one reality

In their 2020 paper on sentience and consciousness, Friston, Wiese and Hobson define dual-aspect monism as the position that reality has a mental aspect and a physical aspect. They state that it is very similar to neutral monism.1 They also say the two may merge, depending on definition. If dual-aspect monism holds that reality is, at a fundamental level, both physical and mental, it comes extremely close to the view that basic entities are intrinsically both. That is a version of neutral monism.2 The authors also point to a possible collapse into panpsychism, citing another source for this.

02

Gains and open problems

Friston and colleagues present one advantage of neutral monism. It addresses the mind-body problem without postulating two basic types of entity, mental and physical.3 Worries about psycho-physical interaction, which troubled Cartesian dualism, therefore disappear. The only causal interaction in question involves neutral entities. The authors add a caution. The problem of mental causation may reappear, because macro-level mental properties may still be causally irrelevant.4 On their account the view removes the interaction problem but does not settle every question about how mental properties act.

03

Questioning the mind-body divide

Ciaunica, Shmeleva and Levin (2023) state that they do not aim to explain how mental states emerge from physical states in the brain. Their point is that the distinction between mind and body, inherited from earlier traditions, tacitly confines cognitive processing to the brain.5 They argue that if cognition is defined as information processing, then all bodily cells are cognitive in this minimal sense, not only those in the brain.6 Their target is the placement of the boundary. They do not offer a solution to the problem itself.

04

Mind across biological systems

Levin and Resnik (2026) acknowledge that the mind-body problem remains one of science's great mysteries.7 They hold that their approach is compatible with scientific materialism, since it does not assume metaphysically irreducible minds.8 They propose moving away from the implicit dualism of sharp boundaries between canonical mindful entities and their more primitive origins. Their account of goal-directedness is not tied to one method of control. They say it can be applied to systems such as ant colonies, genetic regulatory networks and bird flocks.9

SourcesEach quotation was checked word for word against the passage it opens.
  1. Dual-aspect monism is the position that reality has two aspects: a mental and a physical aspect. Dual-aspect monism is very similar to neutral monism.Friston KJ, Wiese W, Hobson JA, 2020 · Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian… · open at passage 60
  2. if dual-aspect monism is defined as the view that reality is, at a fundamental level, both physical and mental, then this comes extremely close to the view that basic entities are intrinsically both mental and physicalFriston KJ, Wiese W, Hobson JA, 2020 · Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian… · open at passage 60
  3. A great advantage of neutral monism is that it solves the mind-body problem without postulating two basic types of entity (mental and physical)Friston KJ, Wiese W, Hobson JA, 2020 · Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian… · open at passage 57
  4. however, the problem of mental causation may reappear, in the sense that macro-level mental properties may still be causally irrelevantFriston KJ, Wiese W, Hobson JA, 2020 · Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian… · open at passage 57
  5. the very distinction between mind and body, inherited from previous traditions, tacitly confines cognitive processing to the brain only.Ciaunica A, Shmeleva EV, Levin M, 2023 · The brain is not mental! coupling neuronal and immune cellular processing in… · open at passage 53
  6. if cognition is defined as information processing, then all bodily cells are cognitive in this minimal sense, not just those operating in the brain.Ciaunica A, Shmeleva EV, Levin M, 2023 · The brain is not mental! coupling neuronal and immune cellular processing in… · open at passage 53
  7. We readily acknowledge that the mind–body problem remains one of science’s great mysteriesLevin M, Resnik DB, 2026 · Mind Everywhere: A Framework for Conceptualizing Goal-Directedness in Biology… · open at passage 34
  8. we are not assuming the existence of metaphysically irreducible mindsLevin M, Resnik DB, 2026 · Mind Everywhere: A Framework for Conceptualizing Goal-Directedness in Biology… · open at passage 34
  9. Since our approach to goal-directedness is not tied to any of these methods, it can be applied to various systems, including ant colonies, genetic regulatory networks, bird flocksLevin M, Resnik DB, 2026 · Mind Everywhere: A Framework for Conceptualizing Goal-Directedness in Biology… · open at passage 23
Linked ideas
Asks how to decide which systems count as minded, a question that the mind-body divide leaves open.
Levin and Resnik build their account of goal-directedness while rejecting metaphysically irreducible minds.
Basal cognitionrelated to
Treats cognition as present in all cells, in line with Ciaunica and colleagues' minimal definition.
Concerns where selfhood and mind are placed across biological scales, against sharp boundaries.
Vitalism and mechanismin tension with
An older dispute over whether living processes need more than physics and chemistry, comparable to the dualism debate.
Friston's framework, within which the dual-aspect discussion of sentience appears.
Friston et al. propose 'Markovian monism': Markov blanket systems are the physics-based basis for repairing Cartesian duality, so the blanket concept serves as a component of their monist solution to the mind-body problem.
Friston et al. propose 'Markovian monism': Markov-blanket physics is used to repair Cartesian duality, giving a monist account of mind and matter. Autopoiesis isn't mentioned in the passage.
Friston et al. use the Markov blanket, a boundary of states separating inside from outside, as the basis for 'Markovian monism', their one-substance repair of Cartesian mind-matter duality.
Friston et al. propose 'Markovian monism': one kind of thing, with any system that has a Markov blanket relevant to mind, offered as a repair for Cartesian duality. Nesting isn't mentioned.
Where it is discussedPassages matching neutral monism, dual-aspect monism, Cartesian duality, mind-body problem
2020Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian… · Friston KJ, Wiese W, Hobson JA12
2026Mind Everywhere: A Framework for Conceptualizing Goal-Directedness in Biology… · Levin M, Resnik DB2
2023The brain is not mental! coupling neuronal and immune cellular processing in… · Ciaunica A, Shmeleva EV, Levin M1