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Predictive processing and interoceptive inference

Predictive processing describes the brain as a hierarchical inference machine that minimises prediction error by matching sensory input to top-down predictions7. A generative model, a mapping from hidden causes to sensory observations, supplies the predictions5. Authors have extended the scheme to plants and to cell collectives, while others question whether it can account for embodied cognition184.

Earliest held
2012, Friston K, Ao P
Most discussed in
From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a…, 2018
In the library
147 passages in 22 works
Rewritten
2026-10-08
01

Prediction in plants

Calvo and Baluška (2015) applied the idea outside animals. Their working hypothesis was that adaptive plant behaviour can only take place through a mechanism that predicts sensory states1. They separated weaker and stronger readings of anticipation. On the weaker reading, a system models the sources of its stimulation internally. Stronger forms of anticipation that explain away internal modelling, as discussed by Stepp and Turvey, could not be ruled out beforehand1. The authors treated predictive coding and strong anticipation as working hypotheses to be tested empirically, not as settled accounts1.

02

The generative model

Constant and colleagues (2018) defined a generative model as a mapping from sensory observations and action policies to external, hidden causes5. Ramstead, Badcock and Friston (2018) described two routes to reducing prediction error. An organism can improve its predictions by altering internal states, which they call perception. Or it can act on the world to confirm its predictions, which they call action7. Constant and colleagues also derived a special case. Under identical synchronisation, the agent's model of its environment is exactly the same as the environment's model of the agent6.

03

Embodiment and its critics

Allen and Friston (2018) argued that predictive coding in comparator models of motor or social control is clearly cognitivist. In those models, rich internal models of a hidden world do the work of cognition3. They noted that Clark presents predictive processing as the most radical step away from a passive view of neural processing, while Hohwy has argued that such approaches are inherently disembodied3. They also listed critiques of these accounts. Critics charge that they are circular, unfalsifiable, or post-hoc explanations. The authors then asked whether enactivism could answer these charges4.

04

Cells and morphogenesis

Friston, Levin, Sengupta and Pezzulo (2015) simulated self-assembly by specifying a generative model and the dynamics of the environment. The equations of motion for the system and its environment then follow2. Pio-Lopez and colleagues (2022) describe cells whose internal states minimise precision-weighted prediction error. The predictions concern signalling states sensed from neighbouring cells, and the authors identify this scheme with predictive coding8. They note that earlier simulations left the generative model and its precision untouched. Kuchling and colleagues altered external parameters to produce disorders of morphogenesis, and Friston and colleagues altered extracellular signals9.

SourcesEach quotation was checked word for word against the passage it opens.
  1. Our underlying working hypothesis is that adaptive plant behavior can only take place by way of a mechanism that predicts sensory states.Calvo P, Baluška F, 2015 · Conditions for minimal intelligence across eukaryota: a cognitive science… · open at passage 11
  2. we only need to specify the generative model and the dynamics of the environment and to completely specify the requisite equations of motion for the system and its environment.Friston K, Levin M, Sengupta B, Pezzulo G, 2015 · Knowing one's place: a free-energy approach to pattern regulation · open at passage 18
  3. The predictive coding implicit in comparator models of motor (or social) control is clearly cognitivist; rich internal models, which explain a world hidden from the agent, do the functional work of cognition.Allen M, Friston KJ, 2018 · From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the… · open at passage 7
  4. RPP (interoceptive or otherwise) are subject to a variety of critiques; which charge for example that they constitute circular/tautological reasoning (Bowers and Davis 2012), are unfalsifiable (Wiese 2014)Allen M, Friston KJ, 2018 · From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the… · open at passage 28
  5. A generative model is a mapping from sensory observations, action policies, to external (hidden) causes.Constant A, Ramstead MJD, Veissière SPL, Campbell JO…, 2018 · A variational approach to niche construction · open at passage 21
  6. the generative model entertained by the agent about its environment is exactly the same as the generative model entertained by the environment about the agent.Constant A, Ramstead MJD, Veissière SPL, Campbell JO…, 2018 · A variational approach to niche construction · open at passage 36
  7. we can either improve our predictions by altering internal states (i.e., perception); or we can act upon the world to confirm our predictions (i.e., action).Ramstead MJD, Badcock PB, Friston KJ, 2018 · Answering Schrödinger's question: A free-energy formulation · open at passage 28
  8. the internal states organize themselves to minimize (precision-weighted) prediction error based upon predictions of sensed signaling states from neighboring cells.Pio-Lopez L, Kuchling F, Tung A, Pezzulo G, Levin M, 2022 · Active inference, morphogenesis, and computational psychiatry · open at passage 76
  9. the previous work on this topic did not investigate the impact of precision and sensory attenuation.Pio-Lopez L, Kuchling F, Tung A, Pezzulo G, Levin M, 2022 · Active inference, morphogenesis, and computational psychiatry · open at passage 24
Linked ideas
Basal cognitionrelated to
Calvo and Baluška test prediction-based accounts of behaviour in plants, outside nervous systems.
Constant and colleagues derive shared agent and environment generative models within a variational account of niche construction.
Pio-Lopez and colleagues model morphogenesis as cells minimising prediction error about neighbouring signals.
Ramstead and colleagues describe organisms as keeping their internal states within bounds by minimising prediction error.
Criteria of mindin tension with
Allen and Friston ask whether predictive accounts of cognition stay confined to the skull or can be embodied.
The inference language applied to blanket states is shared with predictive accounts of perception and bodily regulation.
Passages tie them closely: Fields & Levin cast variational free energy as prediction-error minimisation, and Friston frames free-energy minimisation as action and perception. Allen & Friston treat predictive processing as a broad family.
Passages treat the Markov blanket as the boundary separating internal from external states, which free-energy minimisation operates across. Quantum reference frames themselves are barely touched, only a truncated quantum-framework mention.
Calvo and Baluška invoke predictive coding as one reading of anticipation, which circuit models would realize at the molecular scale.
Predictive processing uses the same idea of internal states encoding expected values of hidden causes of sensation.
Predictive processing is the wider framework in which precision, attention and salience are discussed.
Where it is discussedPassages matching predictive processing, predictive coding, interoceptive inference, prediction error minimization
2018From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the… · Allen M, Friston KJ28
2022Active inference, morphogenesis, and computational psychiatry · Pio-Lopez L, Kuchling F, Tung A…20
2015Knowing one's place: a free-energy approach to pattern regulation · Friston K, Levin M, Sengupta B, Pezzulo…13
2018A variational approach to niche construction · Constant A, Ramstead MJD, Veissière…13
2012Free energy, value, and attractors · Friston K, Ao P12
2013Information and efficiency in the nervous system--a synthesis · Sengupta B, Stemmler MB, Friston KJ11
2019Variational ecology and the physics of sentient systems · Ramstead MJD, Constant A, Badcock PB…10
2016Towards a Neuronal Gauge Theory · Sengupta B, Tozzi A, Cooray GK, Douglas…9
2022Competency in Navigating Arbitrary Spaces as an Invariant for Analyzing… · Fields C, Levin M9
2018Answering Schrödinger's question: A free-energy formulation · Ramstead MJD, Badcock PB, Friston KJ7