Radical embodied cognitive science

Allen and Friston cite Chemero (2011) in two ways. First, as a source for the idea that models should provide 'guidelines for discovery'. They say the free-energy principle and comparator-style models supply this. Second, as an authority for enactive views of embodied cognition, which they characterise by dense causal, dynamical couplings between brain, body and world. They use it to argue that internal-model predictive coding is not truly embodied.

absent are the dense causal, dynamical couplings between internal and external phenomenon that characterize enactive views of embodied cognition (Chemero 2011;

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while comparator-style models provide much needed ‘guidelines for discovery’ (Chemero 2011), they do not evoke the revolutionary views

Allen M, Friston KJ, 2018 · From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework… · open at passage 7

By providing much needed guideline to discovery (Chemero 2011), FEP renders a productive union of the embodied cognition and information theory

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