Romanes, G. J., 1882  ·  passages 30 to 59 of 1414

Animal Intelligence

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inadequate in the other. And likewise, of course, with all other exhibitions of mental life. It is quite true, however, that since the days of Des- cartes—or rather, we might say, since the days of Joule— the question of animal automatism has assumed a new or more defined aspect, seeing that it nowruns straight into the _ most profound and insoluble problem that has ever been presented to human thought—viz. the relation of body to mind in view of the doctrine of the conservation of energy. I shall subsequently have occasion to consider this problem with the close attention that it demands; but in the present volume, which has to deal only with the pheno- mena of mind as such, I expressly pass the problem aside as one reserved for separate treatment. Here I desire only to make it plain that the mind of animals must be placed in the same category, with reference to this pro- blem, as the mind of man; and that we cannot without gross inconsistency ignore or question the evidence of mind in the former, while we accept precisely the same kind of evidence as sufficient proof of mind in the latter.

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And this proof, as I have endeavoured to show, is in all eases and in its last analysis the fact of a living organism showing itself able to learn by its own individual experi- ence. Wherever we find an animal able to do this, we have the same right to predicate mind as existing in such an animal that we have to predicate it as existing in any human being other than ourselves. For instance, a dog has always been accustomed to eat a piece of meat when ‘his organism requires nourishment, and when his olfactory nerves respond to the particular stimulus occasioned by the proximity of the food. So far, it may be said, there is no evidence of mind; the whole series of events com- prised in the stimulations and muscular movements may be due to reflex action alone. But now suppose that by a number of lessons the dog has been taught not to eat the meat when he is hungry until he receives a certain verbal signal: then we have exactly the same kind of evidence that the dog’s actions are prompted by mind as we have that the actions of aman are so prompted.! Now we find

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1 Of course it may be said that we have no evidence of prompting that the lower down we go in the animal kingdom, the more we observe reflex action, or non-mental adjustment, to predominate over volitional action, or mental adjust- ment. That is to say, the lower down we go in the animal kingdom, the less capacity do we find for changing adjustive movements in correspondence with changed conditions; it becomes more and more hopeless to teach. animals—that is, to establish associations of ideas; and the reason of this, of course, is that ideas or mental units. become fewer and less definite the lower we descend through the structure of mind.

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It is not my object in the present work to enter upon. any analysis of the operations of mind, as this will require- to be done as fully as possible in my next work. Never- theless, a few words must here be said with regard to the main divisions of mental operation, in order to define closely the meanings which I shall attach to certain terms. relating to these divisions, and the use of which I cannot avoid. The terms sensation, perception, emotion, and volition need not here be considered. I shall use them in their ordinary psychological significations; and although I shall subsequently have to analyse each of the organic or mental states which they respectively denote, there will. be no occasion in the present volume to enter upon this. subject. I may, however, point out one general con- sideration to which I shall throughout adhere. Taking it for granted that the external indications of mental! processes which we observe in animals are trustworthy, so that we are justified in inferring particular mental states from particular bodily actions, it follows that in con- sistency we must everywhere apply the same criteria.

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For instance, if we find a dog or a monkey exhibiting” marked expressions of affection, sympathy, jealousy, rage, &c., few persons are sceptical enough to doubt that the complete analogy which these expressions afford with in either case; but this is the side issue which concerns the general relation of body and mind, and has nothing to do with the guarantee of inferring the presence of mind in particular cases. those which are manifested by man, sufficiently prove the existence of mental states analogous to those in man of which these expressions are the outward and visible signs. But when we find an ant or a bee apparently exhibiting by its actions these same emotions, few persons are sufficiently non-sceptical not to doubt whether the outward and visible signs are here trustworthy as evidence of analogous or corresponding inward and mental states. The whole organisation of such a creature is so different from that of a man that it becomes questionable how far analogy drawn from the activities of the insect is a safe guide to the inferring of mental states—particularly in view of the fact that in many respects, such as in the great preponderance of ‘instinct’ over ‘reason,’ the psychology of an insect is demonstrably a widely different thing from that ofa man. Now it is, of course, perfectly true that the less the resemblance the less is the value of any analogy built upon the resemblance, and therefore that the inference of an ant or a bee feeling sympathy or rage is not so valid as is the similar inference in the case of a dog ora monkey. Still it 7s an inference, and, so far as it goes, a valid one—being, in fact, the only in- ference available. That is to say, if we observe an ant or a bee apparently exhibiting sympathy or rage, we must either conclude that some psychological state resembling , that of sympathy or rage is present, or else refuse to ~ think about the subject at all; from the observable facts | there is no other inference open. Therefore, having full regard to the progressive weakening of the analogy from human to brute psychology as we recede through the animal kingdom downwards from man, still, as it is the only analogy available, I shall follow it throughout the: animal series.

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It may not however, be superfluous to atest out: that if we have full regard to this progressive weaken- ing of the analogy, we must feel less and less certain of the real similarity of the mental states compared ; so that when we get down as low as the insects, I think the most we can confidently assert is that the known facts of human psychology furnish the best avail- able pattern of the probable facts of insect psychology. Just as the theologians tell us—and logically enough— that if there is a Divine Mind, the best, and indeed only, conception we can form of it is that which is formed on the analogy, however imperfect, supplied by the human ‘mind; so with ‘inverted anthropomorphism’ we must apply a similar consideration with a similar conclusion to the animal mind. The mental states of an insect may be widely different from those of a man, and yet most “probably the nearest conception that we can form of their true nature is that which we form by assimilating them ‘to the pattern of the only mental states with which we are actually acquainted. And this consideration, it is needless to point out, has a special validity to the evo- dutionist, inasmuch as upon his theory there must be a psychological, no less than a physiological, continuity extending throughout the length and breadth of the ‘animal kingdom.

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In these preliminary remarks only one other point requires brief consideration, and this has reference to the ‘distinction between what in popular phraseology is called * Instinct’ and ‘Reason.’ I shall not here enter upon any elaborate analysis of a distinction which is un- doubtedly valid, but shall confine my remarks to ex- plaining the sense in which I shall everywhere use these ‘terms. Few words in our language have been subject to a greater variety of meanings than the word instinct. In popular phraseology, descended from the Middle Ages, all the mental faculties of the animal are termed in- stinctive, in contradistinction to those of man, which are termed rational. But unless we commit ourselves to an obvious reasoning in a circle, we must avoid assuming that all actions of animals are instinctive, and then arguing that because they are instinctive, therefore they differ from the rational actions of man. The question really lies in what is here assumed, and we can only answer it by examining in what essential respect instinct differs from reason.

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Again, Addison says :— I look upon instinct as upon the principle of gravitation in bodies, which is not to be explained by any known qualities inherent in the bodies themselves, nor from any laws of me- chanism, but as an immediate impression from the first Mover, and the Divine energy acting in the creatures. This mode of ‘looking upon instinct’ is merely to exclude the subject from the sphere of inquiry, and so to abstain from any attempt at definition.

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Innumerable other opinions might be quoted from well-known writers, ‘looking upon instinct’ in widely different ways; but as this is not an historical work, I shall pass on at once to the manner in which science looks upon it, or, at least, the manner in which it will always be looked upon throughout the present work. Without concerning ourselves with the origin of in- stincts, and so without reference to the theory of evolution, we have to consider the most conspicuous and distinctive features of instinct as it now exists. The most important point to observe in the first instance is that instinct involves mental operations; for this is the only point that serves to distinguish instinctive action from reflex. Reflex action, as already explained, is non-menta] neuro- muscular adaptation to appropriate stimuli; but in- stinctive action is this and something moré; there is in it the element of mind. Such, at least, is instinctive action in the sense that I shall always allude to it. I am, of course, aware that the limitation which I thus impose is one which is ignored, or not recognised, by many writers even among psychologists; but I am per- _ suaded that if we are to have any approach to definiteness in the terms which we employ—not to say of clear- ness in our ideas concerning the things of which we speak —it is most desirable to restrict the word instinct to mental as distinguished from non-mental activity. No doubt it is often difficult, or even impossible, to decide whether or not a given action implies the presence of the mind-element—+z.e., conscious as distinguished from un- conscious adaptation ; but this is altogether a separate matter, and has nothing to do with the question of

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defining instinct in a manner which shall be formally exclusive, on the one hand of reflex action, and on the other of reason. As Virchow truly observes, ‘it is diffi-- cult or impossible to draw the line between instinctive and reflex action ;’ but at least the difficulty may be narrowed down to deciding in particular cases whether or not an action falls into this or that category of defini- tion; there is no reason why the difficulty should arise on account of any ambiguity of the definitions themselves. Therefore I endeavour to draw as sharply as possible the line which i theory should be taken to separate in- stinctive from: reflex action; and this line, as I have already said, is constituted by the boundary of non-mental or unconscious adjustment, with adjustment in which there is concerned consciousness or mind. |

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Having thus, I hope, made it clear that the difficulty of drawing a distinction between reflex and instinctive actions as a class is one thing, and that the difficulty of assigning particular actions to one or the other of our categories is another thing, we may next perceive that the former difficulty is obviated by the distinction which I have imposed, and that the latter only arises from the fact that on the objective side there is no distinction im- posable. The former difficulty is obviated by the distinc- tion which I have drawn, simply because the distinction is itself a definite one. In particular cases of adjustive action we may not always be able to affirm whether con- sciousness of their performance is present or absent; but, as I have already said, this does not affect the validity of our definition ; all we can say of such cases is that if the performance in question is attended with consciousness it is instinctive, and if not it is reflex.

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And the difficulty of assigning particular actions to one or other of these two categories arises, as I have said, ‘merely because on the objective side, or the side of the nervous system, there is no distinction to be drawn. Whether or not a neural process is accompanied by a men- tal process, it is in itself the same. The advent and de- velopment of consciousness, although progressively con- verting reflex action into instinctive, and instinctive into

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rational, does this exclusively in the sphere of subjec- tivity; the nervous processes engaged are throughout the same in kind, and differ only in the relative degrees of their complexity. Therefore, as the dawn of consciousness _or the rise of the mind-element is gradual and undefined, both in the animal kingdom and in the growing child, it is but necessary that in the early morning, as it were, of consciousness any distinction between the mental and the non-mental should be obscure, and generally impossible to ‘determine. Thus, for instance, a child at birth does not close its eyes upon the near approach of a threatening body, and it only learns to do so by degrees as the result of experience ; at first, therefore, the action of closing the eyelids in order to protect the eyes may be said to be instinctive, in that it involves the mind-element:! yet it afterwards becomes a reflex which asserts itself even in opposition to the will. And, conversely, sucking in a new-born child, or a child im wtero, is, in accordance with my definition, a reflex action ; yet in later life, when con- sciousness becomes more developed and the child seeks the breast, sucking may properly be called an instinctive action. Therefore it is that, as in the ascending scale of objective complexity the mind-element arises and advances gradually, many particular cases which occupy the undefined boundary between reflex action and instinct eannot be assigned with confidence either to the one region or to the other.

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We see then the point, and the only point, wherein instinct can be consistently separated from reflex action ; viz., in presenting a mental constituent. Next we must consider wherein instinct may be separated from reason. And for this purpose we may best begin by considering what we mean by reason. The term ‘reason’ is used in significations almost as various as those which are applied to ‘instinct.’ Some- 1 Te., ancestral as well as individual, If the race had not always had occasion to close the eyelids to protect the eyes, it is certain that ‘the young child would not so quickly learn to do so in virtue of its own individual experience alone; and as the action cannot be attri- ‘buted'to any process of conscious inference, it is not rational; but we have seen that it is not originally reflex ; therefore it is instinctive

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times it stands for all the distinctively human faculties taken collectively, and in antithesis to the mental faculties of the brute; while at other times it is taken to mean the distinctively human faculties of intellect. Dr. Johnson defines it as ‘the power by which man deduces one proposition from another, and proceeds from premises to consequences.’ This definition presupposes language, and therefore ignores all cases of inference not. thrown into the formal shape of predication. Yet even in man the majority of inferences drawn by the mind ‘never emerge as articulate propositions; so that although, as. we shall have occasion fully to observe in my subsequent work, there is much profound philosophy in identifying reason with speech as they were identified in the term Logos, yet for purposes of careful definition so to identify intellect with language is clearly a mistake.

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More correctly, the word reason is used to signify the power of perceiving analogies or ratios, and is in this sense equivalent to the term ‘ratiocination,’ or the faculty of deducing inferences from a perceived equivalency of relations. Such is the only use of the word that is strictly legitimate, and it is thus that I shall use it throughout the present treatise. This faculty, however, of balancing relations, drawing inferences, and so of fore- casting probabilities, admits of numberless degrees ; and as in the designation of its lower manifestations it sounds. somewhat unusual to employ the word reason, I shall in these cases frequently substitute the word intelligence. Where we find, for instance, that an oyster profits by individual experience, or is able to perceive new relations and suitably to act upon the result of its perceptions, I think it sounds less unusual to speak of the oyster as dis-- playing intelligence than as displaying reason. On this account I shall use the former term to signify the lower degrees of the ratiocinative faculty ; and thus in my usage it will be opposed to such terms as instinct, reflex action, &c., in the same manner as the term reason is so opposed. This is a point which, for the sake of clearness, I desire the reader to retain in his memory. [I shall always speak of intelligence and intellect in antithesis to instinct, emo--

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tion, and the rest, as implying mental faculties the same in kind as those which in ourselves we call rational. Now it is notorious that no distinct line can be drawn between instinct and reason. Whether we look to the wing child or to the ascending scale of animal life, we find that instinct shades into reason by imperceptible degrees, or, as Pope expresses it, that these principles are ‘for ever separate, yet for ever near.’ Nor is this other than the principles of evolution would lead us to expect, as I shall afterwards have abundant occasion to show. Here, however, we are only concerned with drawing what distinction we can between instinct and reason as these- faculties are actually presented to our observation. And. this in a general way it is not difficult to do.

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We have seen that instinct involves ‘mental opera- tions,’ and that by this feature it is distinguished from re- flex action ; we have now to consider the features by whicl: ‘it is distinguished from reason. These are accurately, though not completely, conveyed by Sir Benjamin Brodie, who defines instinct as ‘a principle by which animals are induced, independently of experience and reason- ing, to the performances of certain voluntary acts, which are necessary to their preservation as individuals, or to the continuance of the species, or in some other way convenient to them.’! This definition, as I have said, is accurate as far as it goes, but it does not state with sufficient generality and terseness that all instinctive: action is adaptive; nor does it clearly bring out the dis- tinction between instinct and reason which is thus well conveyed by the definition of Hartmann, who says in his. ‘Philosophy of the Unconscious,’ that ‘instinct is action taken in pursuance of an ead, but without conscious per- ception of what the end is.’ This definition, however, is likewise defective in that it omits another of the im- portant differentize of instinct—namely, the uniformity of instinctive action as performed by different individuals of the same species. Including this feature, therefore, we: may more accurately and completely define instinct as. mental action (whether in animals or human beings),

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directed towards the accomplishing of adaptive movement, antecedent to individual experience, without necessary knowledge of the relation between the means employed and the ends attained, but similarly performed under the same appropriate circumstances by all the individuals of the same species. Now in every one of these respects, with the exception of containing a mental constituent and in being concerned in adaptive action, instinct differs from reason. For reason, besides involving a mental con- stituent, and besides being concerned in adaptive action, is always subsequent to individual experience, never acts but upon a definite and often laboriously acquired know- ledge of the relation between means and ends, and is very far from being always similarly performed under the same appropriate circumstances by all the individuals of the same species.

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Thus the distinction between instinct and reason is both more definite and more manifold than is that between instinct and reflex action. Nevertheless, in particular eases there is as much difficulty in classifying certain actions as instinctive or rational, as there is in cases where the explanation of this is, as already observed, that instinct passes into reason by imperceptible degrees; so that actions in the main instinctive are very commonly tempered with what Pierre Huber calls ‘a little dose of judgment or reason,’ and vice versé. But here, again, the difficulty which attaches to the classification of particular actions has no reference to the validity of the distinctions between the two classes of actions; these are definite and

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precise, whatever difficulty there may be in applying them > Another point of difference between instinct and reason may be noticed which, although not of invariable, is of very general applicability. It will have been observed, from what has already been said, that the essential respect in which instinct differs from reason con- sists in the amount of conscious deliberation which the two processes respectively involve. Instinctive actions are actions which, owing to their frequent repetition, become

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so habitual in the course of generations that all the individuals of the same species automatically perform the same actions under the stimulus supplied by the same appropriate circumstances. Rational actions, on the other _ hand, are actions which are required to meet circumstances of comparatively rare occurrence in the life-history of the species, and which therefore can only be performed by an the subordinate distinction to which I allude, viz., that instinctive actions are only performed under particular circumstances which have been frequently experienced

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have occurred even in the life-history of the individual. Thus, then, upon the whole, we may lay down our Reflex action is non-mental neuro-muscular adjust- ment, due to the inherited mechanism of the nervous system, which is formed to respond to particular and often recurring stimuli, by giving rise to particular movements of an adaptive though not of an intentional kind. Instinct is reflex action into which there is imported the element of consciousness. The term is therefore a generic one, comprising all those faculties of mind which are concerned in conscious and adaptive action, antecedent to, individual experience, without necessary knowledge of the relation between means employed and ends attained, but similarly performed under similar and frequently re- curring circumstances by all the individuals of the same species.

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Reason or intelligence is the faculty which is concerned in the intentional adaptation of means to ends. It there- fore implies the conscious knowledge of the relation be- tween means employed and ends attained, and may be exercised in adaptation to circumstances novel alike to the experience of the individual and to that of the species. No one can have watched the movements of certain Infusoria without feeling it difficult to believe that these little animals are not actuated by some amount of intelli-

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ence. Even if the manner in which they avoid collisions — be attributed entirely to repulsions set up in the currents. which by their movements they create, any such mechanical explanation certainly cannot apply to the small creatures seeking one another for the purposes of prey, reproduction, or, as it sometimes seems, of mere sport. There is a common and well-known rotifer whose body is of a cup shape, provided with a very active tail, which is armed at its extremity with strong forceps. I have seen a small specimen of this rotifer seize a much larger one with its forceps, and attach itself by this means to the side of the cup. The large rotifer at once became very active, and _ swinging about with its burden until it came to a piece of weed, it took firm hold of the weed with its own forceps, and began the most extraordinary series of movements, which were obviously directed towards ridding itself of the encumbrance. It dashed from side to side in all directions with a vigour and suddenness which were highly astonish- ing, so that it seemed as if the animalcule would either break its forceps or wrench its tail from its body. No movements could possibly be better suited to jerk off the offending object, for the energy with which the jerks were given, now in one direction and now in another, were, as I have said, most surprising. But not less surprising was

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the tenacity with which the smaller rotifer retained. its hold ; for although one might think that .it was being almost jerked to pieces, after each bout of jerking it was seen to be still attached. This trial of strength, which must have involved an immense expenditure of energy in proportion to the size of the animals, lasted for several minutes, till eventually the small rotifer was thrown violently away. It then returned to the conflict, but did not succeed a second time in establishing its hold. The entire scene was as like intelligent action on the part of both animals as could well be imagined, so that if we were to depend upon appearances alone, this one observation would be sufficient to induce me to attribute conscious determination to these microscopical organisms.

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But, without denying that conscious determination may here be present, or involving ourselves in the impossible task of proving such a negative, we may properly affirm that until an animalcule shows itself to be teachable by in- dividual experience, we have no sufficient evidence derived or derivable from any number of such apparently intelli- gent movements, that conscious determination is present. Therefore, I need not wait to quote the observations of the sundry microscopists who detail facts more or less similar to the above, with expressions of their belief that microscopical organisms display a certain degree of instinct or intelligence as distinguished from mechanical, or wholly non-mental adjustment. But there are some observations relating to the lowest of all animals, and made by a com- petent person, which are so remarkable that I shall have to quote them in full. These observations are recorded by Mr. H. J. Carter, F.R.S., in the ‘Annals of Natural History,’ and in his opinion prove that the beginnings of instinct are to be found so low down in the scale as the Rhizopoda. He says:—‘ Even Athealiwm will confine itself to the water of the watch-glass in which it may be placed when away from sawdust and chips of wood among which it has been living ; but if the watch-glass be placed upon the sawdust, it will very soon make its way over the side of the watch-glass and get to it.’

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to show that the rhizopod distinguishes the presence of the sawdust outside the watch-glass, and crawls over the brim of the latter in order to get into more congenial quarters, while it is contented with the water in the watch- glass so long as there is no sawdust outside. But to pro- ceed: On one occasion, while investigating the nature of some large, transparent, spore-like elliptical cells (fungal?) whose protoplasm was rotating, while it was at the same time charged with triangular grains of starch, I observed some actinophorous rhizopods creeping about them, which had similarly shaped grains of starch in their interior’; and having determined the nature of these grains in both by the addition of iodine, I cleansed the glasses, and placed under the microscope a new portion of the sediment from the basin containing these cells and actinophryans for further examination, when I observed one of the spore-like cells had become ruptured, and that a portion of its protoplasm, charged with the triangular starch-grains, was slightly protruding through the crevice. It then struck me that the actinophryans had obtained their starch-grains from this source; and while looking at the ruptured cell, an acti- nophrys made its appearance, and creeping round the cell, at last arrived at the crevice, from which it extricated one of the grains of starch mentioned, and then crept off to a good dis- tance. Presently, however, it returned to the same cell; and although there were now no more starch-grains protruding, the actinophrys managed again to extract one from the interior through the crevice. All this was repeated several times, — showing that the actinophrys instinctively knew that those were nutritious grains, that they were contained in this cell, and that, although each time after incepting a grain it went away to some distance, it knew how to find its way back to the cell again which furnished this nutriment.

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On another occasion I saw an actinophrys station itself close to a ripe spore-cell of pythiwm, which was situated upon a filament of Spirogyra crassa; and as the young ciliated monadic germs issued forth, one after another, from the dehis- cent spore-cell, the actinophrys remained by it and caught every one of them, even to the last, when it retired to another part of the field, as if instinctively conscious that there was nothing more to be got at the old place.

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But by far the greatest feat of this kind that ever presented itself to me was the catching of a young acineta by an old sluggish amoeba, as the former left its parent; and this took place as follows :— In the evening of the 2nd of June, 1858, in Bombay, while looking through a microscope at some Luglene, &c., which had been placed aside for examination in a watch-glass, my eye fell upon a stalked and triangular acineta (A. mystacina?), around which an ameba was creeping and lingering, as they do when they are in quest of food, But knowing the antipathy that the ameba, like almost every other infusorian, has to the ten- tacles of the acineta, I concluded that the ameba was not en- couraging an appetite for its whiskered companion, when I was surprised to find that it crept up the stem of the acimeta, and wound itself round its body. This mark of affection, too much like that frequently evinced at the other end of the scale, even where there is a mind for its control, did not long remain with- out interpretation. There was a young acineta, tender, and without poisonous tentacles (for they are not developed at birth), just ready to make its exit from the parent, an exit which takes place so quickly, and is followed by such rapid bounding move- ments of the non-ciliated acineta, that who would venture to say, & priori, that a dull, heavy, sluggish ameba could catch such an agile little thing? But the ameba are as unerring and unrelaxing in their grasp as they are unrelenting in their cruel inceptions of the living and the dead, when they serve them for nutrition ; and thus the ameba, placing itself round the ovarian aperture of the acimeta, received the young one, nurse-like, in its fatal lap, incepted it, descended from the parent, and crept off.

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