Evolution and evolvability  ·  Article

Teleology and purposiveness in biology

Authors from the late nineteenth century onward noted that organisms act in ways that favour their own welfare. They disagreed about whether this requires a fore-ordained plan, a mechanism, or a new vocabulary. The question remains open in current work on goal-directedness in cells and tissues.18

Earliest held
1852, Du Bois-Reymond, E. (ed. H.…
Most discussed in
Principles of General Physiology, 1915
In the library
3,741 passages in 219 works
Rewritten
2026-10-08
01

Purpose in early physiology

Verworn (1899, General Physiology) wrote that the purposefulness of living nature had long forced scientists to embrace teleology, meaning a fore-ordained plan of creation.1 Morgan (1901, Regeneration) called the adaptation of organisms to their environment one of the most difficult questions for the biologist. He quoted Pflüger, who held that only those combinations of causes occur that are as favourable as possible for the animal's welfare.2 Rádl (1930) reported that Pflüger formulated a law of teleological causality, under which the cause of a desire also leads to its satisfaction.5 Rádl added that physiology became the leading teleological science after Darwin.5

02

What counts as purposeful

Driesch (1908) distinguished kinds of teleology. He held that processes in human-made machines are purposeful because they are actions of men, and he noted that the concept had thereby been carried over to inorganic events.3 Henderson (1913, The Fitness of the Environment) argued that postulating a general tendency toward fitness is a philosophical act rather than a scientific one.4 Thompson (1992 edition, On Growth and Form) described a view in which the final cause becomes only the result of a process of sifting good from bad. On that view apparent purpose belongs to a mechanical philosophy.6

03

Selection and adaptive design

Constant and colleagues (2018) set out the standard evolutionary account. Under natural selection, traits that enhance fitness are retained and others are lost, and this explains the appearance of adaptive design.7 They contrasted it with niche construction. They judged it unclear whether constructed niches adapt the environment to the organism systematically, because such environments can raise or lower reproductive success. They concluded that niche construction theory might not generate predictions about adaptation.7

04

Teleonomy and goal-directedness

Levin and Resnik (2026) stated that attempts to banish teleological concepts from the life sciences have largely failed. They gave two reasons: life shows goal-directedness that is hard to explain in causal-mechanical terms, and terms such as goal, purpose and function are useful in modelling and experimental design.8 Trewavas (2026) reported that the word teleonomy was coined to replace teleology. He quoted a Nobel prize winner who called purpose essential to the definition of living beings. He defined biological purpose as goal-directed behaviour with no implication of conscious control.9

SourcesEach quotation was checked word for word against the passage it opens.
  1. The fact of purposefulness in living nature, which was so marvellous to men of science in early times, even down to the middle of the present century, forced them constantly to embrace teleologyVerworn, M., 1899 · General Physiology: An Outline of the Science of Life · open at passage 498
  2. Only those combinations of causes take place that are as favorable as possible for the welfare of the animal.Morgan, T. H., 1901 · Regeneration · open at passage 734
  3. All processes contributing to the construction of any kind of engines and machines made by man are purposeful, for they are actions of men.Driesch, H., 1908 · The Science and Philosophy of the Organism · open at passage 281
  4. To postulate such a tendency is, however, in itself rather a philosophical than a scientific actHenderson, L. J., 1913 · The Fitness of the Environment · open at passage 407
  5. That which causes the desire in a living organism is at the same time that which leads to the satisfaction of the desireRádl, E., 1930 · The History of Biological Theories · open at passage 941
  6. a teleology in which the final cause becomes little more, if anything, than the mere expression or resultant of a process of sifting out of the good from the badThompson, D. A. W., 1992 · On Growth and Form · open at passage 37
  7. With standard evolutionary processes (e.g. natural selection), traits that enhance fitness are systematically retained, and those that do not are lost. This explains the appearance of adaptive design.Constant A, Ramstead MJD, Veissière SPL, Campbell JO…, 2018 · A variational approach to niche construction · open at passage 13
  8. Attempts to banish teleological concepts from the life sciences have proven to be largely unsuccessful becauseLevin M, Resnik DB, 2026 · Mind Everywhere: A Framework for Conceptualizing Goal-Directedness in Biology… · open at passage 41
  9. Biological purpose is quite simply goal-directed behavior. There is no implication of conscious control in biological purposeTrewavas A, 2026 · Aspects of plant intelligence (ii) · open at passage 54
Linked ideas
The modern term for what older authors called purposiveness, used without commitment to a fore-ordained plan.
Vitalism and mechanismin tension with
Teleology was often tied to vitalist claims, while mechanistic readings recast purpose as the outcome of selection.
Selection is the standard account of how adaptive design arises without a plan.
Henderson's work on the fitness of the environment is a main source for the dispute over universal teleology.
Niche constructionin tension with
Constant and colleagues question whether niche construction yields systematic predictions about adaptation.
Basal cognitionrelated to
Current work extends goal-directed, purposive behaviour to cells and simple organisms.
Both concern goal-directed behaviour without a brain: Physarum's bandit heuristics and Friston's foraging-like goal-seeking illustrate purposive behaviour, and basal cognition frames it as pursuing 'existential goals'. Teleology itself is never discussed.
Evolvabilityin tension with
Bose says nyctitropic movement evolved stepwise from light-induced differentiation, not 'for the purpose' of plant advantage, warning against circular final-advantage arguments; this contrasts purposive explanation with evolutionary-process explanation.
Passages treat Physarum foraging, route choice and learning as non-neural cognition. Baluška and Levin frame such systems as decision-making and achieving goal states, which is purposiveness, though teleology is never named.
Fields & Levin say living systems from cells to swarms hold state preferences and expend energy to reach them, a goal-directedness that purposive explanation addresses. No passage discusses the teleology dispute itself.
Haldane said the purpose of the altitude changes seems clear, and that a vitalist would read it as evidence of a vital principle.
Ciaunica casts homeostasis maintenance as cells' 'common goals', and Baluška and Levin read homeostatic plasticity as learning-like adaptation, linking homeostasis to goal-directed language. No passage discusses teleology explicitly.
Where it is discussedPassages matching teleology, purposeful activities, purposiveness, design
1915Principles of General Physiology · Bayliss, W. M.189
1890The Principles of Psychology, Vols. 1-2 · James, W.176
1859On the origin of species by means of natural selection, or the preservation of… · Darwin119
1908The Science and Philosophy of the Organism · Driesch, H.106
1906Plant Response as a Means of Physiological Investigation · Bose, J. C.97
1925Elements of Physical Biology · Lotka, A. J.95
1899General Physiology: An Outline of the Science of Life · Verworn, M.90
1912The Life of the Plant · Timiriazeff, C. A.90
1930The History of Biological Theories · Rádl, E.89
1992On Growth and Form · Thompson, D. A. W.87