Instinct versus reason
Romanes said the two can be told apart in a general way, yet held that no distinct line can be drawn between them. Authors disagree on whether a real boundary exists. Romanes held that one shades into the other1. Wasmann, as reported by Rádl, drew the line at consciousness of the end to be attained8.
- Earliest held
- 1859, Darwin
- Most discussed in
- The Principles of Psychology, Vols. 1-2, 1890
- In the library
- 1,222 passages in 90 works
- Rewritten
- 2026-11-19
A continuum in animals
Romanes (1882, Animal Intelligence) said that no distinct line can be drawn between instinct and reason1. He still held that the two classes of action are definite. Particular cases are hard to classify because instinctive actions are often mixed with a little judgment, in Pierre Huber's phrase, and the reverse also occurs2. Wasmann, as reported by Rádl (1930), took a sharper view. He defined intelligent action by consciousness of the end to be attained, and he allowed intelligence only to humans. Animals, even the highest, were for him dominated by instinct8.
Instinct in the psychologist's account
James (1890, The Principles of Psychology) argued that there is no material antagonism between instinct and reason. Humans have all the impulses of lower animals and many more3. On his account reason cannot inhibit an impulse. Only an opposite impulse can do that, though reason may draw an inference that excites the imagination and releases it3. Metchnikoff (1903, The Nature of Man) used the contrast in another way. He read the fear of death as a pure instinct, independent of rational will, following Schopenhauer's phrase "blind will"4.
Mechanism and tropism
Loeb (1912, The Mechanistic Conception of Life) found no sharp line between reflexes and instincts. Authors tended to say reflex for a part of the animal and instinct for the whole animal, as in tropisms5. He rejected the test that treats purposeful action as a sign of consciousness. On that test, if an animal reacts as a rational human would, it counts as conscious6. Timiriazeff (1912, The Life of the Plant) applied similar reasoning to the root. He held that no rational will, habit, taste or instinct need be assumed to explain how roots discriminate, since simple physical laws suffice7.
Instinct in plants
Now it is notorious that no distinct line can be drawn between instinct and reason.
Romanes, G. J., 1882 · Animal Intelligence · open at passage 46actions in the main instinctive are very commonly tempered with what Pierre Huber calls ‘a little dose of judgment or reason,’ and vice versé.
Romanes, G. J., 1882 · Animal Intelligence · open at passage 49In other words, there is no material antagonism between instinct and reason. Reason, per se, can inhibit no impulses ; the only thing that can neutralize an impulse is an impulse the other way.
James, W., 1890 · The Principles of Psychology, Vols. 1-2 · open at passage 2600This " blind will " is no other than a pure instinct which is independent of our rational will.
Metchnikoff, E., 1903 · The Nature of Man: Studies in Optimistic Philosophy · open at passage 270they speak of instincts where the reaction of the animal as a whole is involved (as is the case in tropisms)
Loeb, J., 1912 · The Mechanistic Conception of Life · open at passage 125If an animal or an organ reacts as a rational human being would do under the same circumstances, these authors declare that we are dealing with a phenomenon of consciousness.
Loeb, J., 1912 · The Mechanistic Conception of Life · open at passage 129It is therefore quite unnecessary to presuppose any rational will, habits, tastes or instinct in order to explain the discriminating property of the root
Timiriazeff, C. A., 1912 · The Life of the Plant · open at passage 229Here there is consciousness of the end to be attained. By this criterion we can distinguish between intelligent actions and merely instinctive ones.
Rádl, E., 1930 · The History of Biological Theories · open at passage 666The equivalent “instinct” in vascular plants might be the developmental cycle; seed to flower to seed.
Trewavas A, 2026 · Aspects of plant intelligence (ii) · open at passage 21
| 1890 | The Principles of Psychology, Vols. 1-2 · James, W. | 258 |
| 1882 | Animal Intelligence · Romanes, G. J. | 202 |
| 1903 | The Nature of Man: Studies in Optimistic Philosophy · Metchnikoff, E. | 118 |
| 1908 | The Science and Philosophy of the Organism · Driesch, H. | 60 |
| 1859 | On the origin of species by means of natural selection, or the preservation of… · Darwin | 60 |
| 1900 | Comparative Physiology of the Brain and Comparative Psychology · Loeb, J. | 49 |
| 1908 | The Animal Mind: A Textbook of Comparative Psychology · Washburn, M. F. | 38 |
| 1925 | Elements of Physical Biology · Lotka, A. J. | 31 |
| 1902 | Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution · Kropotkin, P. | 30 |
| 1957 | An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine · Bernard, C. | 29 |